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FULL LENGTH MANUSCRIPT

Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The
Jurisprudence of Chief Justices Roger B. Taney
and Salmon P. Chase
Alexandra Michalak1
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The University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA

The role of the United States Supreme Court in the
Antebellum and Civil War eras often fades into the
background of history, overshadowed by the roles of both
the executive and legislative branches of the United States
through pre-war conflict, military strategy, and
Reconstruction efforts. Historian Herman Belz argued
that in the Civil War era, “The issues that lay at the core
of the controversy were political in nature and rightly
belonged to the political branches to decide. And with
one major exception, the judicial branch generally
respected this limitation.” 1 The infamous exception Belz
alluded to, Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), overshadows
the impactful judicial history of the era, comprised of key
cases such as Groves v. Slaughter (1841), Prigg v.
Pennsylvania (1842), Jones v. Van Zandt (1847),
Shortridge v. Macon (1867), Mississippi v. Johnson
(1867), and Texas v. White (1869). Although a valuable
observation, the judicial branch played a larger role than
Belz granted credit because of the efforts of two chief
justices: Roger B. Taney and Salmon P. Chase. Both men
served as diametrically opposed jurists in terms of
jurisprudence, legal strategy, and personal and political
beliefs, yet both chiefs pushed the limits of the judicial
branch to further their individual beliefs on slavery.
Nonetheless, each chief justice left a distinct mark on
Civil War, slavery, and Reconstruction case law by
incorporating both legal and political arguments into their
opinions through judicial activism.
Chief Justice Taney and Chief Justice Chase sat at center
seat at two antipodal time periods wedged apart by the
Civil War: 1836 to 1864, and 1864 to 1873, respectively.
Taney’s death and Chase’s appointment occurred amid
critical points between 1863 and 1864. Major turning
points on the battlefield occurred, such as the battles of
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, as well as the fall of Atlanta.
The Emancipation Proclamation delivered by President
Abraham Lincoln and the decisive election of 1864
Herman Belz, “The Supreme Court and Constitutional
Responsibility,” The Supreme Court and the Civil War
(1996): 7.
1

further determined the fate of the Union, shifting the
debate surrounding slavery to amending the Constitution.
This transition between chiefs serves as a backdrop to
both jurists’ judicial methods, political beliefs, and case
law legacy, as well as each jurists’ individual impact on
political controversies. Born thirty-one years apart, raised
in contrasting geographical regions of the United States,
and appointed by two vastly different presidents, both
chiefs left a distinct, albeit significant mark on
Antebellum and Civil War era legal history.

TANEY’S EARLY LIFE: SOUTHERN LIFSETYLE,
PROSLAVERY POLITICS, AND JACKSONIAN
PRINCIPLES
Descended from two lines of prominent families, Taney
grew up a product of wealth and privilege on a southern
tobacco plantation in Calvert County Maryland. Born in
1777, Taney lived surrounded by wealth generated
through slavery his entire life, considering that his father,
Michael Taney, “by the eve of the Revolution . . . was one
of the wealthiest men in the country.” 2 Significant
quantities of slaves and land “created the wealth that sent
Taney to college in Pennsylvania and supported him as he
began his legal career,” and later maintained his wealth
upon inheritance. In fact, “in the course of his life, slaves
served his family in households in Frederick, Baltimore,
and Washington, D.C. Eventually he . . . inherit[ed] more
land and slaves from his father,” and gained even more
when his wife brought some to the marriage in 1806.3
Taney lived in a slave economy and society for his entire
life, except for the three years he lived in the free state of
Pennsylvania to attend Dickinson College at the age of
fifteen. After his stay in Pennsylvania, he never again
lived with “people who were not southerners and slave
owners,” residing in the “narrow cultural milieu of the
slaveholding Chesapeake, living in Maryland and

2
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Washington, D.C.”4 Taney’s social environment and
upbringing constructed his viewpoint on slavery, serving
as the root of his staunch proslavery stance.
Originally aligned with the Federalist Party, in 1799
Taney won a seat in the Maryland House of Delegates.5
He first disconnected from the Maryland Federalists
through supporting the War of 1812, and by the time the
Federalist Party had fully dissolved, Taney had shifted his
support to the Jacksonian Democrats.6 As a result of his
shifting political allegiances, in 1816 Taney won election
to the Maryland state senate, where he served until 1821.
Foundations of his political views on slavery began to
emerge in this position, and historians and scholars have
long debated Taney’s actions and motives in this period
of his life. In attempts to defend Taney and his beliefs,
scholars often point to Taney’s support for legislation that
prevented the kidnapping of freed slaves and the
manumission of some of his own slaves.
Indeed, in this period, Taney defended the free speech
rights of Reverend Jacob Gruber, a white Methodist from
Pennsylvania who condemned slavery in an 1818 speech.
Taney defended Gruber against a charge of inciting slaves
to revolt, portraying Taney as a protector of antislavery
rhetoric.7 Although a welcomed victory for abolitionists,
Taney’s action revealed little more than his dedication to
his client, his skillful use of First Amendment protections,
and Taney’s ability as a lawyer. All these actions can be
reduced to “charitable noblesse oblige” consistent with
Taney’s “Federalist politics, and his moderate position as
a slaveholder, colonizationist, and a supporter of the rule
of law.”8
Despite these antislavery performances, Gruber is the last
time Taney said anything in public that was remotely
hostile to slavery.9 Defenders of Taney often forget that
he “quickly emerged as a politician who zealously
protected slavery and was unalterably opposed to the
rights of free blacks.”10 In addition, while in the Maryland
senate, he also “supported a resolution to prevent
Maryland slaves from escaping into Pennsylvania,”
further protecting slave owners in Maryland.11 Even
before Taney exercised his judicial power on the Supreme
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Court to preserve slavery, Taney worked in his early life
to maintain and promote slavery.
In 1831 President Jackson appointed Taney as the United
States Attorney General, and in 1832, Taney provided
strong evidence of his view on slavery and African
Americans in an unpublished opinion.12 Taney insisted
that:
The African race in the United States even when free,
are every where a degraded class, and exercise no
political influence. The privileges they are allowed to
enjoy, are accorded to them as a matter of kindness
and benevolence rather than of right. They are the
only class of persons who can be held as mere
property, as slaves. And where they are nominally
admitted by law to the privileges of citizenship, they
have no effectual power to defend them, and are
permitted to be citizens by the sufferance of the white
population and hold whatever rights they enjoy at
their mercy. They were never regarded as a
constituent portion of the sovereignty of any state.
But as separate and degraded people to whom the
sovereignty of each state might accord or withhold
such privileges as they deemed proper.13
He later argued a long-winded version of this statement in
Dred Scott, establishing one of the most recognized yet
most egregious opinions in Supreme Court history. This
particular statement demonstrated not only Taney’s
position on slavery, but also that “he held these views a
quarter of a century before Dred Scott. Taney never
published this opinion, and therefore it did not affect
public debate. But it certainly bolstered Jackson’s handsoff policy toward Southern regulations of free blacks.”14
Taney never retreated from these beliefs; he soon became
a leading advocate for not only Jacksonian economic
policies, but Jacksonian views on slavery. Taney’s beliefs
and actions prior to his chief justiceship differ from
Chase’s pre-chief years in that Chase dedicated his life to
preventing the spread and eliminating the existence of
slavery, while Taney maintained and promoted his
proslavery beliefs.
Taney played a significant role as attorney general in the
second Bank of the United States controversy, “helping to

4

11

5

12

Ibid., 178.
Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery.
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 77.
6
David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 5th
ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), 1090.
7
Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice: Slavery in the
Nation’s Highest Court, 180.
8
Ibid., 180.
9
Ibid., 181-182.
10
Ibid., 182.

Ibid., 180.
David G. Savage, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court,
5th ed., 1090-1091.
13
Unpublished Opinion of Attorney General Taney as
cited in Carl B. Swisher, Roger B. Taney. (Hamden:
Archon Books, 1961), 154.
14
Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’:
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,”
Journal of Supreme Court History 1994 (1994): 90-91.

THE CARDINAL EDGE
write Jackson’s message in 1832 vetoing the bank’s
recharter.”15 He even stepped in to preside over the new
system of pet banks for nine months when Jackson
dismissed his own Treasury Secretary, William Duane.
However, Congress soon learned of Taney’s informal
appointment and promptly rejected his nomination.
Jackson had a better plan for Taney in mind, and
appointed Taney to replace Associate Justice Gabriel
Duvall.16 As a result of a close Senate vote to confirm
Taney’s nomination, Congress postponed Taney’s
nomination indefinitely; the postponement provided
Jackson with an opportune moment. Much “to the horror
of the Whigs, who considered [Taney] much too radical,”
Jackson appointed Taney to center seat upon Chief Justice
John Marshall’s death in 1835. The Senate confirmed
Taney’s nomination on March 15, 1836, where Chief
Justice Taney began his long twenty-eight years of service
on the High Court.17 Taney’s ascendency to the chief
justiceship not only represented the overbearing slave
power of the South in all three branches of government
but foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s role in upholding
proslavery doctrine before the outbreak of the Civil War.

A SLAVEHOLDER AND PROSLAVERY
ADVOCATE AT CENTER SEAT
Aside from Dred Scott, two other Supreme Court cases
reveal Taney’s views on slavery, both Groves v.
Slaughter and Prigg v. Pennsylvania. In Groves, the
Court examined a Mississippi state constitutional
provision that banned the importation and sale of slaves
and whether it violated the Commerce Clause found in
Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The
Court decided in favor of Slaughter, the individual who
sold the slaves, explaining that the Mississippi state
constitutional provision was not enacted at the time of the
sale, therefore, rendering the contract valid and affording
Slaughter the right to recover on promissory notes from
the buyer.18
As only one of the fourteen separate opinions Taney wrote
throughout his tenure, his concurring opinion proved
“Indicative of what would be his highly partisan approach
to slavery throughout his career.”19 The Court did not
reach the issue of the power of Congress to regulate the
trafficking of slaves. However, Taney himself admitted
15
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that he would use this opportunity to address an issue that
“is not involved in the case before us. But as my brother
[Justice] McLean has stated his opinion upon it, I am not
willing, by remaining silent, to leave any doubt as to
mine.” In addressing this issue, Taney stepped outside of
his judicial power granted to him, substituting a
discussion of the controversy at hand for an argument
supporting his own political beliefs.
He continued on, explaining that the “power over this
subject is exclusively with the several states, and each of
them has a right to decide for itself whether it will or will
not allow persons of this description to be brought within
its limits, from another state, either for sale, or for any
other purpose.”20 His opinion read as an admonition
directed at northern politicians, insisting that the “federal
government had no power over slavery,” despite the fact
that neither petitioner nor respondent brought that issue to
the Court. This opinion held a clear proslavery stance,
favoring states’ rights to regulate interstate slave trade.
Taney safeguarded his position on this case by leaving no
question as to what views he held; he clearly “did not want
to leave any implication that under the Commerce Clause
Congress might regulate slavery.”21
Although his
concurring opinion held no binding power on the law,
Taney’s proslavery sentiment expressed through his
position on the Supreme Court further promoted the
proslavery cause, and bolstered political proslavery
arguments.
Taney again demonstrated his explicit views on slavery
only one year later in his opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part in Prigg. Prigg proved to be a
significant case for a variety of reasons, namely that it
served as the “first fugitive slave case to arrive before the
Supreme Court.”22 Taney strategically assigned the
opinion of this case to Associate Justice Joseph Story;
“likely he chose Story because it would be advantageous
to have a northern justice issue an opinion that many
contemporaries would consider proslavery . . . Likely, it
had been clear at the time of the opinion’s assigning that
all the justices agreed that Pennsylvania’s law should be
struck down as unconstitutional.”23 The majority in Prigg
examined a Pennsylvania law that prohibited the
extradition of African Americans for the purposes of
slavery under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, as
20
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well as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. Story, writing
for the majority struck down the Pennsylvania law,
upheld the federal fugitive slave law of 1793, and further
declared that slaveowners had a Constitutional right to
seize their slaves anywhere they found them. His opinion
served as a sweeping victory for slavery, “which shakes
to the core his antislavery reputation.”24
However, true to his nationalist beliefs, Story twisted his
opinion to support what concerned him the most:
“securing the high ground for congressional power to
legislate.”25 Story explained that “The right to seize and
retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in
whatever State of the Union they may be found is, under
the Constitution recognized as an absolute positive right
and duty pervading the whole Union with an equal and
supreme force uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state
sovereignty or state legislation.” Story continued,
securing his nationalist view in his argument by
illustrating that the fugitive slave clause created
A new and positive right . . . The natural inference
deducible from this consideration certainly is . . . that
it belongs to the legislative department of the national
government . . . It would be a strange anomaly, and
forced construction, to suppose that the national
government meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its
own proper duties and rights which it intended to
secure, upon state legislation; and not upon that of the
Union.26
Story injected his own political viewpoint into the case,
and considering Story’s nationalist analysis, it is evident
that “Taney would come to regret assigning Story to the
opinion.”27
In another one of his separate opinions, Taney disagreed,
arguing that the states possess the power to pass laws that
aided the return of fugitive slaves. Taney ignored his own
previous departure from the question presented to the
Court in Groves, criticizing Story, claiming that he does
not “consider this question [of exclusivity] as necessarily
involved in the case before us.”28 This dismissal of his
own actions in favor of slavery revealed Taney’s
dedication to preserving slavery from the bench. Taney’s
opinion once again held no binding power over the law,
but only contributed to the proslavery movement and to
Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’:
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,”
92.
25
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26
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27
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24
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the culmination of judicial discourse that led to the Dred
Scott decision.
Clearly protecting southern states’ interests and
reinforcing the compact theory of the Union, Taney
argued that the words in the law “seem evidently designed
to impose it as a duty upon the people of several states to
pass laws to carry into execution, in good faith, the
compact into which they solemnly entered with each
other.” He then asked, “why must not a state protect a
right of property, acknowledged by its own paramount
law?” Taney then drew a comparison between slaves and
other forms of property, demonstrating that “the laws of
different states, in all other cases, constantly protect the
citizens of other states in their rights of property, when it
is found within their respective termitories [sic]; and no
one doubts their power to do so.”29 In addition to his
dismissal of his own departure from the constitutional
question in Groves, Taney’s slavery jurisprudence served
as a contradiction in and of itself. Prigg demonstrated that
“When it came to slavery, Taney supported state power
for the southern states, while rejecting the right of the free
states to protect the rights of free African-Americans.”30
These logical discrepancies and Taney’s tendency to pick
and choose when to apply certain constitutional
provisions when it came to slavery demonstrated Taney’s
explicit interest in preserving slavery through law and the
judiciary.
Overall, although a victory for the South, Prigg served as
a landmark case in the general scheme of Antebellum case
law. The Taney Court’s decision in Prigg resulted in farreaching consequences; “it convinced many abolitionists
that the Constitution was the problem, not the solution, to
slavery.”31 In stark contrast to Chase’s political and
constitutional strategy at the height of his career, the
Taney Court suggested a bleak future for abolitionists and
antislavery politicians alike. In 1842 when the Court
handed down Prigg, both groups could not have imagined
nor predicted the impending devastation of Dred Scott.
Compared to his previous jurisprudence on race and
slavery, in the 1850s, Taney unleashed his most violent
views of slavery and “abandoned all pretense of neutrality
in sectional issues. ‘Behind his mask of judicial propriety,
the Chief Justice had become privately a bitter
Justice Taney’s separate opinion in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
29
Justice Taney’s separate opinion in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
30
Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’:
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,”
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31
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sectionalist, seething with anger at Northern insult and
Northern aggression.’”32 Assigning the majority opinion
to himself, Taney used Dred Scott to his advantage; he
seized this moment to perform, in his opinion, service to
the public by resolving an intense constitutional issue that
was dividing the nation.33 At this point in the national
debate over slavery and in his career, Taney understood
that he served as “in some ways, the Confederacy’s
greatest ally in Washington.”34 Compared to the other
“lilliputian nonentities” leading the nation at the time such
as President Franklin Pierce and President James
Buchanan, “Chief Justice Taney seemed to be the only
leader in any branch of government,” and Taney
recognized that himself.35
Tension between northerners and southerners on Capitol
Hill proved ever growing in the late 1850s, providing
Taney with an ideal setting. Except for Associate Justice
Robert Grier, “all of the other justices took the
opportunity to express separate opinions” on at least some
of the issues in the case, yet Taney did not stand alone on
his Court. In the end, “seven justices concluded that the
Scotts remained slaves, while two believed that Dred
Scott and the other members of his family were legally
entitled to their freedom.”36
Taney began his opinion by settling the issue of
jurisdiction, turning to the question of citizenship.37
Harkening back to his 1832 unpublished opinion as
attorney general, Taney reasoned that “because free
blacks lacked fundamental rights at the time the
Constitution was adopted, they were not considered
citizens at that time,” and further concluded that the
“descendants of slaves could not become citizens of the
United States,” and, therefore, could not possess standing
to sue in federal court.38 As a result, Taney concluded that
the Court did not hold proper jurisdiction.
At this point in his argument, Taney could have ended his
opinion from a purely legal perspective.39 The beginning
of the opinion proved a great victory for the South and
proslavery supporters. However, Taney again abandoned
Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’:
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,”
87.
33
James F. Simon, “Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney,”
Journal of Supreme Court History 35 (2010): 231-233.
34
Paul Finkelman, “‘Hooted Down the Page of History’:
Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney,”
98.
35
Ibid., 85.
36
Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery,
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the central legal question presented, addressing the issue
of race, the place of African Americans in United States
society, and other issues pertaining to slavery in the new
territories. His opinion struck down the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, categorized slaves as property
under the Fifth Amendment, and decided that any law
depriving a slave owner of that property violated the
Constitution.40
Of course, Taney’s constitutional argument in Dred Scott
appeared unpersuasive and reaching, but aside from the
case’s obvious disgrace, other lasting implications
emanate from the case: “[Taney] did not practice judicial
self-restraint, he was the first Chief Justice to persuade the
Court to invalidate a major national policy enacted by
Congress, and he was the first jurist to appreciate the full
potential of the Supreme Court as a legislative body.”41
Although a controversial decision in the context of the
1857 Court and the Court of today, Taney, “At one stroke
. . . significantly enlarged the scope of judicial power by
finding a standard in the Constitution of substantive
fairness.”42 The defining case of Taney’s career provided
not only a irreparable harm to the United States, to
African Americans, and to the Supreme Court, but altered
the Supreme Court’s power and its legacy.
Other scholars and historians have argued that Dred Scott
served as an unusual mistake for Taney, referring to his
opinion as an aberration that diverged from his usual
jurisprudence. Although Dred Scott served as the greatest
mistake of Taney’s career and perhaps of the entire
history of the Supreme Court, scholars must not “reduc[e]
his slavery jurisprudence to just one case” and then
dismiss the case as a single mistake. By doing so,
“scholars misunder[stand] the depth of Taney’s support
for slavery and his hostility to African-American
rights.”43
Taney’s views on slavery proved well
developed before he sat on the High Court, and well
before he wrote his infamous decision. As a result, “far
from aberration, Dred Scott can,” and should, “be seen as
the culmination of Taney’s ideas on race and slavery.”44
Taney’s early life and career, as well as the line of cases
38
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from Groves and Prigg, demonstrate that Taney pursued
the measured goal of reinforcing proslavery case law
throughout his tenure; in Taney’s mind, Dred Scott served
as the ultimate achievement of that goal, one that
decelerated and opposed the life work of Chief Justice
Chase.

CHASE’S EARLY LIFE: FROM “ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF FUGITIVE SLAVES” TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ABOLISTIONIST
Born into the free state of New Hampshire on January 13,
1808, Chase came from a prominent family dating back
to the 1640s in the United States. At age twelve, Chase
traveled to live with his uncle, a Protestant Episcopal
Bishop. His devotion to his Episcopalian faith became
instilled in him while living with his uncle, further
inspiring Chase’s antislavery views. He graduated from
Dartmouth College in 1826, and then studied law under
Attorney General William Wirt. After passing the bar in
1829, Chase moved west to practice law in Cincinnati,
Ohio.45
In time, Chase became known as the “attorney general for
fugitive slaves.” He joined the antislavery movement
early, recognizing the tremendous power slaveholders
gained from fugitive slave laws, and dedicated his early
career to defending runaway slaves.46 In 1837 Chase
defended a runaway slave named Matilda; the argument
he used in this case later became one of his most notorious
defenses of fugitive slaves. Chase challenged the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, crafting a multifaceted
argument that claimed that the Act granted no
enforcement power to Congress.47
In the end, Chase failed to convince the local judge, who
remanded Matilda back to the slave catchers. Although
Chase’s efforts fell short at the local level, Chase’s
argument “in the Matilda case was published as a
pamphlet and distributed widely throughout the country
45
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where it elevated his visibility and provided the legal basis
for other challenges to the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Act.”48 The pamphlet, titled Speech of Salmon P.
Chase, in the Case of the Colored Woman, Matilda,
brought Chase’s argument to the national level, serving as
a valuable step forward in the antislavery movement
while amplifying Chase’s antislavery ideas.
Chase built on this argument and used the Matilda case to
develop a stronger claim for another fugitive slave case
presented to the Supreme Court in Jones v. Van Zandt. In
addition to the structural objection of the Fugitive Slave
Act, Chase added a Fifth Amendment due process
argument, contending that “Now, unless it can be shewn
[sic] that no process of law at all, is the same thing as due
process of law, it must be admitted that the act which
authorizes seizures without process, is repugnant to the
constitution.”49 Chase bolstered his argument through
referencing the intention of the framers, “appealing to
what he called the ‘plain import’ of the text.”50
Unfortunately, the Taney Court dismissed Van Zandt on
the pleadings, and Chase never appeared to argue before
the Court because of a rule Taney implemented that
“denied oral argument on matters that had already been
adjudicated.”51
However, as in Matilda, Chase’s
constitutional arguments in Van Zandt gained national
attention through a published pamphlet, even appearing in
the Western Law Journal.52 The impact of Van Zandt and
Chase’s argument better served the antislavery cause than
the Taney Court’s decision on the issue, which upheld the
Fugitive Slave Law as constitutional.53
After Chase’s fugitive slave arguments gained national
attention, Chase used his constitutional arguments to
begin his political career in the 1840s. In 1840 he helped
form the Liberty Party and became a leading member.54
In 1848, however, Chase stepped away from the Liberty
Party and helped form the Free Soil Party. The party’s
platform adopted Chase’s contention that the “founders
Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten
Career of Salmon P. Chase,” 663.
50
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51
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had intended to make slavery a local institution, and that
the federal government was barred by the Fifth
Amendment from creating the condition of bondage
anywhere in its jurisdiction.”55 He served as a United
States Senator from the Free Soil Party from 1849 to
1855, until he left the Senate to serve as the Governor of
Ohio from 1855 to 1859.56 Chase officially aligned with
the Republican Party when he left the Senate, playing a
major role in the party’s establishment. As in the Free
Soil platform, the Republicans supported Chase’s claim
that Congress lacked the authority to recognize or create
slavery anywhere in its jurisdiction, and adopted this
argument in its 1856 and 1860 platforms.57
The constitutional arguments Chase made in Matilda and
Van Zandt served as only the beginning of Chase’s
antislavery political career; he and other Republicans
employed these arguments to convince “thousands of
northerners that anti-slavery was the intended policy of
the founders of the nation.”58 Chase established the
rallying cry of “freedom national” for the Senate
Republicans, declaring in the Senate: “‘Freedom is
national; slavery only is local and sectional’”59 In terms
of Chase’s legacy, his “constitutional abolitionism”
proved his most valuable political contribution to the
antislavery movement.60 As opposed to Taney, who used
his early political career to promote the continuation of
slavery through proslavery laws and sentiment, Chase
developed, promoted, and spread the concept of
constitutional abolitionism, a unique approach to the
tumultuous political debate surrounding slavery.
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Republican Party, and “help[ed] explain why Lincoln’s
victory in 1860 provoked the Southern states to secede.”63
While firm in his beliefs and goals, Chase can be
characterized as a radical who twisted anti-slavery
arguments into widely popular political charges, which
necessarily required concession in order to rally
widespread political support. Chase’s argument for
constitutionality served as essential and better defined the
parameters of anti-slavery for northerners and those in the
Republican Party who wavered between opinions on
slavery.
Chase’s creative interpretation of the
Constitution and his talent as a legal mind caught the
attention of President Lincoln, who appointed Chase to
his cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury in 1861.64
Lincoln and Chase often disagreed, and Chase’s cabinet
position intensified their conflict. Disagreements ranged
from economic issues to war resources, but slavery and
Reconstruction served as the most contested issue
between the two. In fact, Chase “allowed himself to
become the focus of an anti-Lincoln group within the
Republican Party.”65 Chase privately criticized Lincoln
for being so dilatory on slavery, and later railed against
Lincoln’s pocket veto of the Wade-Davis bill.66 Chase
went as far as accusing “Lincoln and his advisors . . . of a
Reconstruction plan that would leave slavery in place.”67
Chase admitted in his journal on July 6, 1864 that Senator
Samuel C. Pomeroy, “cannot support Lincoln, but wont
[sic] desert his principles,” then confessed that “I [share]
much of the same sentiments; though not willing now to
decide what duty may demand next fall.”68

Although his arguments proved politically persuasive,
“no federal court adopted Chase’s constitutional
interpretation in the ante-bellum years.”61 However,
Chase’s legal and “constitutional arguments are
remarkably persuasive compared to those advanced by
the Supreme Court in cases such as Dred Scott.”62 In
addition, his arguments strengthened the power of the

Disagreements between the two and other political
ambitions pushed Chase to resign from the cabinet only
seven days after that journal entry in July of 1864, where
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he writes “today I leave Washington a private citizen.”69
Throughout his career, Chase would never quite suppress
his fierce desire for the presidency. Chase attempted to
gain the Republican nomination for president as early as
1856, and for every presidential election thereafter.
Despite failure to attain his most sought-after position,
Chase signaled interest in a judicial post to round out his
career. Often after experiencing frustration with his
political ambitions, “he yearned for what he supposed was
the relative peace and quiet of the Supreme Court.” He
reasoned that a judicial post “could also be a useful base
for his presidential ambitions,” still refusing to retire his
dream.70
Regardless of his political aspirations, Chase’s
accomplishments proved best achieved through legal
strategy and reasoning. Lincoln recognized Chase’s adept
legal mind despite the discord between the two, and upon
Chase’s resignation from the cabinet, Lincoln accepted
the resignation with relief. Lincoln reassured irritated
Chase supporters at the time of Chase’s resignation that
“‘if I have the opportunity, I will make him Chief Justice
of the United States.’”71 Lincoln and the “Republicans
knew that the courts would be crucial in establishing a
new, free, constitutional order once the war was over . . .
Chase was not only one of the preeminent Republican
political leaders, but he had been among the leading legal
and constitutional spokesmen of the antislavery
movement.”72 The Civil War itself proved to be an
unprecedented event; Lincoln and Congress realized early
on that Reconstruction would serve as an even more
strenuous legal feat.
Volumes of legislation flowed from both the legislative
and executive branches, enhancing the “role of the federal
judiciary, and the Supreme Court's role in defining what
[this legislation] meant.”73 In December of 1864, the
Supreme Court underwent a revolutionary shift. The
Supreme Court that had previously consisted of
southerners and southern sympathizers during the
Antebellum and Civil War years welcomed new
leadership in 1864; the proslavery, slave owning author of
Dred Scott was succeeded as Chief Justice by the attorney
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general for fugitive slaves, marking a radical shift in the
judicial branch’s case law on slavery.

AN ANTISLAVERY CHAMPION AS CHIEF
JUSTICE: THE CHASE COURT’S
RECONSTRUCTION CASE LAW
By the time Taney died and Chase took center seat, the
Court composed of an “essentially new complement of
Justices. Of those who had sat more than a few years with
Chief Justice Roger Taney, only Samuel Nelson and
Robert Grier were to remain for a significant time.”
Lincoln appointed four new justices during his presidency
in addition to Chase, including Noah H. Swayne, Samuel
F. Miller, David Davis, and Stephen J. Field.74 The Chase
Court signified a new era of the role of the Court,
considering in the Reconstruction years alone “the Chase
court struck down eight federal statutes” and “35 state
laws as unconstitutionally restrictive of the rights of
blacks,” compared to the two federal statutes struck down
in the entire history of the Supreme Court. Through the
lens of his constitutional abolitionist outlook, Chase did
not hesitate to strike down laws in violation of the
Constitution that proved antithetical to the antislavery
cause.
Even following Lincoln’s death and the
uncertainty of Reconstruction, “Chase steadfastly assured
the Radical Republicans in Congress a free hand to
continue with the Reconstruction programs in the South
without judicial review or interference.”75
Justices still practiced circuit riding at the time of Chase’s
tenure, and the Judiciary Act of 1866 readjusted the
circuit boundaries. Mindful of the disproportionate power
granted to the southern states through circuit boundaries
and of the “expanding territorial reach of the American
continent and the growing amount of litigation,” Congress
rearranged five of the nine circuits that consisted of slave
states alone.76 Chase presided over Taney’s old circuit
that encompassed Maryland, North Carolina, and
Virginia. Perhaps out of a desire to enforce and uphold
Reconstruction efforts at a local level, “Chase found
circuit court duties more to his taste. For there he was
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very much his own man and most of his decisions had
immediate, direct impact.”77
Chase addressed secession and rebellion in Shortridge v.
Macon. Macon, the defendant, claimed that the existence
of the Confederacy and certain laws passed under that
government confiscated a debt owed to the plaintiff. The
Court, however, affirmed the continuity of federal
sovereignty over the Confederacy during the war. As a
result, federal sovereignty maintained the right of
northern creditors to collect debts from the South incurred
prior to secession and war.78
Chase addressed the issue at hand with ease, deciding that
“War, therefore, levied against the United States by
citizens of the Republic, under the pretended authority of
the new state government of North Carolina, or of the socalled Confederate government which assumed the title of
the ‘Confederate States,’ was treason against the United
States.”
Relying on international law principles
throughout his decision, Chase argued that “on no
occasion, however, and by no act, have the United States
ever renounced their constitutional jurisdiction over the
whole territory . . . or conceded to citizens in arms against
their country the character of alien enemies, or admitted
the existence of any government de facto, hostile to itself
within the boundaries of the Union.”
Chase then administered a warning, explaining that
“Those who engage in rebellion must consider the
consequences. If they succeed, rebellion becomes
revolution . . . if they fail, all their acts hostile to the
rightful government are violations of law, and originate
no rights which can be recognized by the courts.”79 In the
end, Chase concluded that “Legal rights could neither be
originated nor defeated by the action of the central
authorities of the late rebellion,” and therefore, Macon
must fulfill payment of his debt. Overall, Chase decided
that secession did not serve as a valid defense to treason.80
In a letter to Horace Greeley in June of 1867, Chase
explained his reasoning in Shortridge:
I saw no ground on which the rebel acts of
sequestration could be set aside, if the de facto
character of the rebel government were admitted; for
it is the universal rule that the acts of a defacto
government done during its existence as such, are
77
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valid. And there is no middle ground between a
defacto government, and a treasonable combination
of rebels in arms, every exercise of whose pretended
authority against the government is treason.81
Harkening back to his days in the Senate and cabinet,
Chase relied on the outcome of the war, reinforcing the
Republican ideal that the Confederacy had to pay for the
consequences of its actions through Reconstruction.
Outside of the Fourth Circuit, the Chase Court decided
Mississippi v. Johnson (1867) and Texas v. White (1869),
two significant Reconstruction era cases. Decided only
two months before Shortridge, the Court in Johnson
“unanimously held it had ‘no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties.’”82 Relying heavily on Chief Justice John
Marshall’s argument in Marbury v. Madison (1803),
Chase outlined a distinction between the ministerial and
discretionary responsibilities of the president. Chase
defined a ministerial duty as “a simple, definite duty,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and
imposed by law.” In contrast, Chase explained that the
duty brought by the Reconstruction Acts to President
Andrew Johnson “is in no just sense ministerial. It is
purely executive and political,” and it would be, in the
words of Marshall, “an absurd and excessive
extravagance” if the Court could weigh in on the
performance of the executive branch.
Through making a separation of powers argument, Chase
concluded that “neither [branch] can be restrained in its
action by the judicial department; though the acts of both,
when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance.”83 Through this decision, Chase preserved
the right of the president to enforce the first and second
Reconstruction Acts, although alleged to be
unconstitutional by several southern states. The Chase
Court received political support from Republicans in
Congress upon hearing the decision in this case; Chase
documented this support in a letter to Associate Justice
David Davis, recounting that “Almost all were glad that
we decided the Mississippi and Georgia cases, and
decided them as we did.”84
Chase “finally succeeded in writing most of the Radical
philosophy of Reconstruction into the Constitution” in the
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most significant Reconstruction case brought to the
Supreme Court, Texas v. White.85 He secured and
established the permanency of the Union, further
enshrining the idea that “Union victory had rested on a
firm legal foundation.”86 The Court addressed the
questions of whether Texas possessed the right to bring
suit and whether Texas could constitutionally reclaim
Confederate bonds.87
Chase began his majority opinion by addressing the major
threshold problem: “the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
only if the suit was between ‘a State and Citizens of
another State,’ and Texas had purported to secede from
the Union. Thus, the Chief Justice found it necessary to
hold that secession was unconstitutional.”88 Reusing the
secession argument from Lincoln’s first inaugural, Chase
disposed of the secession argument in only a paragraph:
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial
and arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies,
and grew out of a common origin, mutual sympathies,
kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical
relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the
necessities of war, and received definite form, and
character, and sanction from the Articles of
Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly
declared to “be perpetual.” And when these Articles
were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the
country, the Constitution was ordained to “form a
more perfect Union.” It is difficult to convey the idea
of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these
words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union,
made more perfect, is not?
He concluded that the “Constitution, in all its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.” Since Texas joined the Union
under the presumption that it joined an indissoluble
relationship, the secession of Texas, and of all the other
states which seceded, violated the Constitution. Texas
retained its status as a state of the Union; therefore, Texas
possessed the right to bring suit.
Chase addressed the second question by arguing that the
law passed in 1862 by the rebellious Texas government
that repealed an 1851 law requiring endorsement of the
governor to issue state bonds did not serve as a valid law;
therefore, the rebellious Texas government “cannot be
regarded in the courts of the United States, as a lawful
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legislature, or its acts as lawful acts.”89 As a result, the
Court rendered the act repealing the 1851 law null and
void, deeming the Confederate bonds worthless. It is true
that Chase and the majority engaged in a one-sided
contradiction, where the Court “accepted without
supporting argument the standard Radical view of . . .
secession: the Southern states had annihilated their rights
but not their obligations.”90 Nonetheless, the Court
deemed the rebellious Texas government as invalid, all
while maintaining that Texas remained a state throughout
the conflict.

A DIRECT COMPARISON OF TANEY AND
CHASE
In terms of career milestones, Taney and Chase lived
similar lives. Although Chase’s true dedication and
ambition rested in politics, both jurists started out as
young attorneys, served in some legislative capacity, and
served in the executive branch. The length of Taney’s
tenure more than doubles Chase’s time on the Court,
providing Taney with more time to enshrine his
proslavery sentiment in Antebellum case law. Both men
served in a political setting for a similar length of time;
Chase however, used his time more effectively,
promoting his antislavery beliefs through significant
political action and legislation. As with many people
from this period, the most fundamental belief separating
Taney and Chase proved in step with the nation in the
Civil War era: Taney’s proslavery sentiment and Chase’s
antislavery commitment.
Evident in each of their early lives, Chase’s genuine
antislavery actions further separate Taney and Chase.
Compared to Taney, Chase supported his expressed
beliefs on fugitive slaves in court through his antislavery
actions, applying his beliefs to real political advocacy.
Chase served the interests of his client as Taney did,
except Chase’s beliefs on slavery never faltered
throughout his career, and certainly never changed to
support the opposing side. Stemming from his deep
religious and moral views, Chase dedicated his entire
career to the antislavery cause, shaping the Constitution
into an antislavery document to persuade his colleagues.
His sympathy in the antislavery cause proved genuine;
Chase recounted in his journal reading Uncle Tom’s
Cabin and weeping, as well as the horror story of a
fugitive slave named Rosetta who Chase represented, and
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the sorrow he felt toward her and the abuses she
endured.91 Chase made his true beliefs regarding slavery
available rather than hiding behind his duties as a lawyer.
Later in life, Taney did the same as attorney general,
revealing his vehement support for slavery. Just as
Chase’s inspiration for his beliefs surrounding slavery
stemmed from his religious devotion, Taney’s
slaveholding status, regional bias, and dedication to a
slave society inspired his proslavery beliefs. Evidenced
by Taney’s passionate judicial opinions throughout his
chief justiceship, Taney held proslavery views from the
beginning until the end of his life, a product of his heritage
and predisposition to slavery as a slave owner.

CONCLUSION
Despite opposing views, both jurists used the cases
brought to the Court to advance their own agendas
regarding slavery. Although Taney tended to stray away
from the question presented to the Court to a greater
extent than Chase, both jurists practiced judicial activism
in attempting to write political arguments into the law.
For Taney, the most obvious example of this practice is in
Dred Scott, where Taney believed he settled the question
of slavery once and for all. Chase’s judicial activism
proved more subtle in his opinions; he artfully intertwined
legal reasoning with his political agenda as he practiced
all throughout his career. However, through private
correspondence, blatant Republican ideals, and legal
opinions, Chase promoted his antislavery agenda from the
bench. Although the executive and legislative branches
settled much of the debate surrounding slavery through
legislation, war, and constitutional amendments, the
judicial branch, through Chief Justices Taney and Chase,
pushed, pulled, and altered the discussion of slavery,
further inspiring the other two branches on both sides of
the controversy. Both jurists left a distinct mark on Civil
War era case law, shaping the role of the Supreme Court
in Civil War and Reconstruction history and its judicial
review functions for decades to come.
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